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If modeling means searching for a structural design for prospective
constitution making, then it can be claimed that the early Latin American
constitutions were "modeled" on the United States Constitution. The
intention to adopt the U.S. presidential model of governance in Latin
America was well evidenced,1 as well as the tendency of the Latin
American presidential system to deviate into authoritarianism.
Commentators attempted to explain this phenomenon through a
comparative examination of parliamentarism and presidentialism.2 The
* Professor of Law and Director of the Comparative and International Law
Institute at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D.C.
1 A. P. BLAUSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 25-29 (1993).
2 See generally Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism, and
Presidentialism with Special Reference to Latin America, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY: TRANSITION IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Douglas Greenberg et
al. eds., 1993); Council for the Consolidation of Democracy's Report on Constitutional
Reform in Argentina, in PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT
(Arend Lijphart ed., 1992) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT].
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conclusions were to illustrate that a "less democratic" character of
presidentialism contributed significantly to political problems of the
region.3 In looking for a remedy, commentators often suggested that
Latin American countries incorporate more features of parliamentary
systems or experiment with "mixed" models of governance.4
This article presents arguments that the above-mentioned diagnosis
should be carefully analyzed and suggests that a remedy be double-
checked before applied. First, the article demonstrates that, since the
early stages of post-colonial history, the Latin American states modified
U.S. presidentialism. The states have already experimented with many
features of a parliamentary system, adopted a model of judicial review
which was an amalgam of several well-known models, and wrestled with
their own ethnic, cultural and legal problems not linked to the U.S.
system of governance. Second, the article examines Western European
and post-communist experiments with "mixed" models of governance,
exposing some problems with their application. Third, it reviews some
over-used arguments about the "less versus more" democratic character
of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The article concludes with the
observation that blending together constitutional features, produced by
long-term practice in some countries, requires a deep comparative
knowledge. The eclectic character of the "mixed constitutions" justifies
concern over their consistency. Consistency is one of the basic features of
a good constitution. The term implies that constitutional provisions gel in
such a manner that their rationale is fully explainable, and that they mesh
with other components of the constitutional system. The Latin American
countries have already attempted to "mix" elements of presidentialism
with parliamentarism and components of civil law and common law
systems. The results were not always impressive, thus it is a good time to
consider whether "less" rather than "more" mixing would be good for
this region.
I. BETWEEN Two WORLDS: U.S. INFLUENCE ON THE PROCESS OF
FORMATION OF LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
The framers of the United States Constitution, meeting in Philadelphia
in May 1787, fully recognized that they would have to take a "new-way"
approach to government making. In The Federalist No. 9, Alexander
Hamilton wrote about the new tasks:
The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the
introduction of legislative ballances [sic] and checks; the institution
3 See, e.g., Nino, supra note 2, at 46-64. Although the thesis about "democratic"
dysfunctional features of presidentialism is questionable, the article is an excellent
examination of the Latin American problems with corporatism.
4 Council for the Consolidation of Democracy's Report on Constitutional Reform in
Argentina, in PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 158-61.
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of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good
behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by depu-
ties of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have
made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times.
They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of
republican government may be retained and its imperfections less-
ened or avoided.5
The new approach did not stem from the total lack of doctrinal ante-
cedents, but from the awareness that the European models of govern-
ment fit the needs of the rising American Union only to a limited extent.6
The framers' concept of governmental checks and balances differed from
the English model, where powers were neither balanced nor well sepa-
rated. In revolutionary France the idea that functions of the government
should be diffused was implemented in a way different than envisioned
by the Americans.7 Although in France the principle of the division of
powers was associated, to a large degree, with the idea concerning the
separation of the organs and their functions, the emphasis was put on
different roles within the divisions and not on a collaborative effort
between powers. s
Developing the presidential power was even more difficult. In the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, the center of political philosophers'
attention was the relationship between monarchs and representative bod-
ies,9 while the role and function of the executive was largely ignored.' ° In
European monarchies, kings were recognized as sovereign powers and
Ministers worked for them.1' Over time cabinet governments with dual
5 THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
6 For further discussion on the formation of the U.S. presidential system, see
generally Rett R. Ludwikowski, Politicization and Judicialization of the U.S. Chief
Executive's Political and Criminal Responsibility: A Threat to Constitutional Integrity
or a Natural Result of the Constitution's Flexibility?, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 405 (2002).
1 See generally ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLAY, THE
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM (1977).
8 Id. at 217 (stating that
The leaders of the French Revolution saw the principle [of separation of powers]
in more abstract and conceptual terms.... Each power was entirely independent
of the others: collaboration between powers was forbidden and, theoretically,
unnecessary because each had been delegated the fragment of the national
sovereignty necessary to discharge its functions.
Id.
s For further discussion see Ludwikowski, supra note 6, at 408-09.
10 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT: THE CRUCIBLE OF
LEADERSHIP 5 (2d ed. 1965) (stating that "[t]he Framers floundered in dealing with
these questions because neither theory nor practice was of much help.").
11 In France and England, where the American Framers looked most for some
features which they could borrow, the position of a prime minister was fully formed in
2003]
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executives, Monarchs and Prime Ministers, evolved. Post-colonial leaders
seeking to develop their own systems of government did not find this
model helpful but, instead, sought to break from the European monar-
chic traditions and establish a system to meet their new needs. Colonies
such as South Carolina, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania elected "presi-
dents" to moderate the king's council's meetings and, since the first meet-
ings of the Continental Congress in the fall of 1774, its presiding officers
held the same title. This practice resulted in the tendency of calling the
elected chiefs of republican political entities "presidents." The question
of the presidential power remained controversial and was only partially
resolved by the drafters of the United States Constitution; in fact, prac-
tice shaped the real scope of the Chief Executive Officer's prerogatives.12
The American practice also predominantly contributed to the develop-
ment of another great novelty of modern times, the institution of judicial
review. The so-called American decentralized model was rooted in the
concept of constitutional supremacy. The idea that a constitution should
be drafted, not by regular legislative bodies but by special conventions, to
which the people delegate a constituent power, originated in the United
States as well." The American Constitution imposed rigid amendment
requirements and this, coupled with the principle of its supremacy,
inferred on courts the right to "disqualify any repugnant laws," thereby
developing the concept of checks and balances.' 4 This system implied
that one power is balancing, controlling, and supplementing the functions
of the other. However, no single power can completely subrogate the
other. This decentralized and concrete system gave the courts power to
nullify the law in concrete disputes involving concrete parties. The princi-
the seventeenth century. The prime ministerships of Richelieu or Mazarini in France
were well established. A similar prime ministerial position emerged in England in the
time of George I, who was often absent from the debates of his cabinet and relied
heavily on his administrators selected to preside the meetings. E.C.S. WADE & A.W.
BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44-45 (10th ed. 1985).
12 For more examination, see Ludwikowski, supra note 6, at 408-09.
13 The conventions, in the sense of assemblies of the representatives of a nation,
had their European roots. The best examples of such meetings would be the
parliamentary convention, which reestablished Charles II on the British throne in
1660. The constitutional conventions, which would draft basic framework documents
of a country, however, were the American invention. The 1787 Constitutional
Convention was preceded by the Annapolis Convention, which was arranged in
September 1786 to discuss economic problems of several states. It was dissolved upon
the recommendation that its work will be continued in May 1787 by the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. See CARL B. SWISHER, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 29-30 (1943).
14 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet
Dominance: Current Development, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L., 155, 157-58 (1993)
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ple of stare decisis extended the validity of the courts' decision to other
cases.
15
The colonial elites in the predominantly Spanish and Portuguese terri-
tories of Central and South America carefully watched the constitutional
developments in the United States and the political transformations of
continental Europe.' 6 On the one hand, the prospective leaders of this
colonized New World realized that the decline of their countries' colonial
status was possible because of Napoleon's inroads into the Iberian Penin-
sula. On the other hand, the process of the separation of the North
American colonies from England seemed to provide a structural design
which could serve as a pattern for all new post-colonial states. Europe,
with its philosophy of Enlightenment and newly drafted legal codes of the
Napoleonic era, was dragging Latin America into the family of civil law
countries. 7 The United States lured them by its well-functioning consti-
tutional model, absorptive markets, and investment capital. As Robert
Barker correctly observed:
Thus, while Latin Americans subscribed to some French formula-
tions of human rights, they were less enthusiastic about France as a
governmental model. The Spanish historian Salvador de Madariaga,
comparing the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century, has
said that the United States Revolution was the more productive of
the two, because to Latin Americans, it inspired fewer fears.' 8
Latin America, with similar North American colonial history, tried to
follow the U.S. experience in departing from the European monarchic
traditions and replacing them by republican and federal concepts of gov-
ernment.' 9 The presence of the United States' political ideas in the
region can be found in the constitutional preambles, in implanted consti-
15 Rett R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions-Product of an East-Central
European Constitutional Melting Pot, B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 49 (1998).
16 Harry Kantor, Efforts Made by Various Latin American Countries to Limit the
Power of the President, in PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 101. (stating
that "[ilt was logical for the victorious military leaders [of Latin American countries]
to turn towards the US model in setting up their new governments."). For more
comments on the spread of the Iberian Law to Latin America, see David S. Clark,
Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 405,
406-13 (1975).
17 Robert C. Means, Codification in Latin America: The Colombian Commercial
Code of 1853, 52 TEX. L. REV. 18, 22 (1973).
18 Robert S. Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas: A Bicentennial Perspective,
49 U. PIn. L. REV. 891, 900 (1988) (citing SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA, CUADRO
HISTORICO DE LAS INDIAS 823 (1945)).
19 Barker, supra note 18, at 899-900. See also ALLAN R. BREWER-CARfAS,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 156 (1989) (discussing the role of judicial
review in the foundation of Latin American countries).
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tutional rigidity, in the concept of separation of powers, and in experi-
ments with judicial review.
While Latin American states borrowed, sometimes heavily, from the
U.S. model, it was tested but not duplicated in all details."z The discrep-
ancies, which resulted in many deviations from the original concept of
presidentialism and contributed to Latin American experiments with
authoritarianism, require at least a two-fold analysis of the formal,
namely intentional, deviations of the Latin American concepts from the
U.S. paradigm and the objective problems with implanting presidential-
ism in this region. Both issues warrant a short presentation of the funda-
mental features of the U.S. system, as contrasted with some major
governmental alternatives reviewed in the past and recently by the fram-
ers of Latin American constitutional systems.
II. SYSTEMS OF PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT:
MAJOR EUROPEAN MIXED SYSTEMS
It is sometimes claimed that the doctrine of the division of power as
practically applied in various countries contributed to the development of
the two major political systems: presidential and parliamentary govern-
ment." Although the distinction between the two systems is not as great
as it was at their inception, that original dichotomy is still valuable as an
analytical tool. An efficient way to distinguish variations of the two
major political systems is to focus on several fundamental features of
each one.2 2 The presidential system, typically associated with the Ameri-
can system, is characterized by a concentration of executive power in the
office of the President. The President, as the sole executive, is elected as
head of state and head of the government.2 3 The legislature is indepen-
dently elected for fixed terms and separated from the executive. 4 The
President can call a special session of the legislature or force its adjourn-
ment, but he cannot dissolve the legislature or mandate new elections.25
The President appoints his cabinet with the advice and consent of one
house of the legislature, but cabinet members are not part of the legisla-
20 Tom Farer, Consolidating Democracy in Latin America; Law, Legal Institutions
and Constitutional Structure, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1295, 1300-10 (1995)
(elaborating on at least eight distinct characteristics, which set Latin American states
apart from North America and Western Europe).
21 See Douglas V. Verney, Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems: Analysis of
Political Systems, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A READER 175-78 (Harry Eckstein &
David E. Apter eds., 6th ed. 1968).
22 For a more elaborate list of the basic features of the presidential and
parliamentary systems, see id. at 175-91. For further discussion on the distinctions
between systems, see Ludwikowski, supra note 15, at 31-35.
23 See Verney, supra note 21, at 187.
24 Id. at 189.
25 Id.
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ture.26 Although the legislature can call upon cabinet members to
account for their actions, the legislature cannot veto those actions by a
vote of no confidence.
A typical distinguishing feature of the parliamentary system is the dual
executive. Presidents or monarchs serve as head of state, essentially
"senior statesmen" or "supreme arbitrators," while the prime minister is
the politically accountable chief executive. When the head of state is a
president, he is generally elected by the parliament or a type of Electoral
College rather than directly by popular vote." The head of state,
whether or not a president, then appoints the head of government with
the consent of the parliament, and the head of government appoints the
ministry. Distinct from the rigorous separation of powers seen in the
presidential system (especially its American form), the parliamentary sys-
tem is characterized by a fusion of the legislature and executive. Minis-
ters are generally members of parliament, and are responsible to the
legislature insofar as it may vote the executive out of office without turn-
ing the question over to the people. In some parliamentary systems, the
head of state and the head of government can together dissolve the legis-
lature and force elections before the end of the parliamentary term.
Potentially exercising control over both the legislative and the executive
powers, parliament is the most powerful element of government, meaning
"[t]he supremacy of Parliament as a whole over its parts is a distinctive
characteristic of parliamentary systems. '' 28 Nevertheless, within the par-
liament, the executive has no dominion over the legislature nor the legis-
lature over the executive.
While conventional wisdom suggested that a pure parliamentary sys-
tem characterized post-World War II democracies, 9 parliamentary
supremacy was only clearly discernable where a state had a multi-party
system leading to coalition governments dependant on the fluctuating
opinions of the supporting majorities of deputies." Ruling governments
26 Id. at 187.
27 There are exceptions to this pattern and recently more states with parliamentary
systems (especially in the new post-socialist democracies) elect Presidents directly.
28 Id. at 181.
29 AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND
CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 38 (1984) (arguing that in the
group of twenty-one postwar democracies, seventeen had pure parliamentary systems,
two had mixed presidential-parliamentary systems, one a semi-presidential system
and one (the United States) had a pure presidential system).
30 For comments on the process of the transition to cabinet government in
Great Britain, see E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33-34, 112-13 (11th ed. 1993). For the role of small parties that
have the potential to create coalition governments, particularly in Italy, see Geoffrey
Pridham, Italian Small Parties in Comparative Perspective, in SMALL PARTIES IN
WESTERN EUROPE: COMPARATIVE AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Geoffrey Pridham
& Ferdinand Muller-Rommel eds., 1991). See generally Geoffrey Pridham, An
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in countries with two party systems could generally assert sufficient con-
trol over their party's parliamentary representation, guaranteeing some
stability and influence in the legislative process. Exemplified by the Brit-
ish system, this arrangement endowed the prime minister with formidable
power. To distinguish it from a pure parliamentary system, the arrange-
ment where the government wielded decisive influence has been termed
the "parliamentary-cabinet system., 31
The German parliamentary system, the so-called "chancellor's democ-
racy," evolved in response to the fear that allocating power to a frag-
mented parliament could lead to governmental impotence. The situation
is avoided by enhancing the Chancellor's power without abandoning the
parliamentary system. The Chancellor alone controls the policy of the
federal government, while the Ministers only have autonomy in spheres
designated by the Chancellor's guidelines.32 Second, while the lower
house of parliament (the Bundestag) may dismiss the Chancellor, the
"constructive vote of no confidence" requires that the Bundestag simulta-
neously choose a successor by a two-thirds majority.13 Finally, if sup-
ported by the President and the upper house of parliament (the
Bundesrat), the government may survive for up to six months without the
support of a majority of the Bundestag under the "legislative emergency
procedure., 3 4
The French conceived of a hybrid system referred to as a presidential-
parliamentary system, or semi-presidentialism.35 While traditionally
favoring a parliamentary system, the Fifth Republic introduced several
features which, at least initially, pulled the French model closer to the
Inductive Theoretical Framework for Coalitional Behavior: Political Parties in Multi-
Dimensional Perspective in Western Europe, in COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE: AN INDUCTIVE MODEL FOR WESTERN EUROPE (Geoffrey
Pridham ed., 1986).
31 TWOJA KONSTYTUCJA (YOUR CONSTITUTION) 82 (1997) (noting that W.
Osiatynski goes so far in the evaluation of the influence of the British PM as to state
that, in practice, he has more power than the American president).
32 Art. 65 BGB, translated in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPULIC OF GERMANY 367 (1994).
33 Id. art. 67.
34 Id. art. 81.
31 See Stephen Holmes, A Forum on Presidential Powers, 2-3 E. EUR. CONST. REV.
36, 39 (1993). See Maurice Duverger, A New Political System Model: Semi-
presidential Government, 8 EUR. J. POL. RES. 165, 173, 176-77 (1980) (claiming that, in
Europe (until 1989) besides France, only Portugal could meet conditions
distinguishing semi-presidential systems from other systems: direct elections of the
president, significant actual and constitutional prerogatives of the president, political
dependence of the prime minister on the confidence of parliament). The system has
been also called "premier-parliamentarism." See MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART &
JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND
ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 55 (1992).
HYBRID CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA
presidential system. While retaining a dual executive, the people directly
elect the President who is, in turn, less dependent on Parliament. The
President appoints the head of government without seeking Parliamen-
tary approval, though Parliament does have the power to vote the gov-
ernment out of office. The President may, in cooperation with the Prime
Minister, dissolve the legislature and call new elections. Although the
President cannot veto Parliamentary action, he can request reconsidera-
tion of bills which he opposes. 36 Ministers cannot sit in Parliament, thus
maintaining a more rigid separation between executive and legislative
than typically found in parliamentary systems. As a counterpoint, how-
ever, some legislative functions can be assigned to the executive who then
legislates in those areas by decree. This hybrid system has "elements
both of parliamentary and presidential systems., 37
This short review of the major models of government warrants several
comments. First, it must be noted that constitution-making techniques
are changing. Modern constitution drafting resembles techniques of
social engineering rather than modeling. Even this characterization is
unsatisfactory, however. While the engineer has many choices in what
sort of structure to build, he cannot experiment outside the draftsman's
shed for fear of exposing the occupants to harm. Constitutional drafters,
however, have traditionally tested their creations in actual operation.
The drafters' work resembles cooking rather than engineering. Constitu-
tional institutions are not erected from well-tested interlocking elements.
Rather, the components are carefully selected from different countries
and regions, combined with the traditional ingredients of the host state-
each changed by and changing the other. These "new dishes" do not
resemble traditional French or German fare; they are new blends with an
eclectic character combining cultures, tastes and styles.
Second, the growing number of "mixed" constitutions undermined the
clarity of presidential and parliamentary systems' definitions. The dichot-
omy dividing the Western democratic world on pure presidential and
pure parliamentary systems is in decline. Comparativists note that it may
be easier to determine what features are shared by the countries with
parliamentary and presidential systems than to find out what exactly are
specific components distinguishing these models. For example, direct
elections of the chief executive officer are not a characteristic component
of the presidential system. The original U.S. system provided for the
president to be elected for a limited term and chosen by electors; the
"unit rule," giving all state's votes to a winner of the popular state's elec-
tions, became a practice at the end of the nineteenth century when the
electors started automatically casting their votes for winning party candi-
36 LA CONSTITUTION [CoNsT. FRANCE] art. 10, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 5 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2000) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES].
37 ALEX N. DRAGNICH, MAJOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 274 (1992).
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dates. In Ray v. Blair the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that "[h]istory
teaches that the electors were expected to support the party nominees.,
38
Direct elections, however, ceased to characterize exclusively presidential
systems. In modern times, many countries with parliamentary systems
elect their presidents directly. Similarly, the U.S. concept of checks and
balances became increasingly popular in the states experimenting with
mixed models of government. The drafters of the new twentieth century
constitutions emphasize that they go beyond Montesquieu's system of
divided powers and portray institutions, which are not only separated but
which share functions and are able to hamper each other. 39 The presi-
dential right to veto legislative actions was also incorporated into the
practice of parliamentary governments, as well as wide presidential nomi-
nation power. In many countries with parliamentary systems, the minis-
ters also do not sit on the legislatures.
Only three traditional attributes of the presidential system remain
almost intact: the centralized executive concentrating the functions of a
head of state and head of government; the lack of political responsibility
of the members of cabinet before the parliament; and the lack of presi-
dential or executive prerorgative of a dissolution of the legislature.
Third, regardless of the enormous general influence and popularity of
American constitutionalism in the world, the U.S. presidential system did
not make major inroads into the political culture of the countries of the
world. Comentators could not agree how many states really are attracted
to the U.S. model. A. Przeworski and M. Alwarez indicated, in the begin-
ning of the nineteeth century, that fifty out of the one hundred and six
existing democracies show attributes of a presidential system."° In 1994,
Giovanni Sartori was inclined to classify only twenty states as presidential
republics, adding that they are mostly located in Latin America.41 This
number might be further reduced in light of recent attempts to depart
from this system in the Latin American region.
Fourth, the above-mentioned transformations are interrelated. The
changing techniques of constitution-making resulted in the shrinking of
"pure" governmental models and the mushrooming of so-called "mixed"
38 343 U.S. 214, 228 (1962). See also id. at 228-31; HAROLD W. CHASE & CRAIG R.
DUCAT, EDWARD S. CORWIN's: THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
454 (14th ed. 1978).
19 See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF
LEADERSHIP 33 (1960); GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND OUTCOMES 86
(1994); Paul R. Verkul, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1989).
40 A. Przeworski, M. Alwarez, Parliamentarism and Presidentialism: Which Works?
Which Lasts?, Address at the Congress of Polish Sociological Society (June 17-30,
1994). See also S. GEBETHNER, KONSTYTUCYJNE SYSTEMY RZADOW 79 (Michal
Domagata ed., 1997).
41 See SARTORI, supra note 39, at 85, 174.
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models. The question remains: To what extent will the process of inter-
mingling different components of several well-known constitutional mod-
els work in practice? The recent experiments with "mixed" models seem
to contribute more to reservations than to enthusiasm about the results of
"blending" technics.
III. LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVIATIONS FROM
U.S. PRESIDENTIALISM
Even a very sketchy review of Latin American constitutions reveals
numerous borrowings from U.S. constitutional ideas. The preambles of
several constitutions echoed the language adopted by the Philadelphia
Convention. For example, the preamble to the Argentinean Constitution
of 1853 clearly resembled the U.S. act. It reads:
We, the representatives of the people of the Argentine Nation,
assembled in General Constituent Congress, by the will and election
of the provinces which compose it, in fulfillment of pre-existing
pacts, with the object of constituting the national union, establishing
justice, consolidating internal peace, providing for common defense,
promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty
to ourselves, to our posterity, and to all men in the world who wish
to dwell on Argentine land: invoking the protection of God, source
of all reason and justice, do ordain, decree this Constitution for the
Argentine Nation.4"
The Preamble has stayed intact even after several constitutional
reforms and still provides the introduction to the text of the current Con-
stitution of 1994.43
The 1886 Constitution of Columbia also referred to the people who
came together to decree the Constitution for "the purpose of guarantee-
ing the national unity and assuring the safety of justice, liberty, and
peace., 44 The Cuban Constitution of 1940"5 and the current Brazilian
Constitution of 1988 started with similar phrases: "We the representatives
42 CONSTITUCION ARGENTINA DE 1853 [CONST. ARO.] pmbl., translated in THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAS 14-32 (Russell H. Fitzgibbon et al. eds., 1948)
[hereinafter THE CONSTITUTIONS]; CONST. ARG. (1994), translated in 1
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 36, at 1.
43 See CONST. ARC. (1994) pmbl.
44 CONSTITUCION POLfTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1886 [CONST. COLOM.], translated in
THE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 166. The 1991 Constitution of Colombia opens
with the statement: "The people of Colombia, in the exercise of their sovereign
power, represented by their delegates to the National Constituent Assembly ......
CONST. COLOM., translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 36, at
163.
45 REPUBLICA DE CUBA CONSTITUC1ON DE 1940 [CONST. CUBA], translated in THE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 227.
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of the ... People, convened the National Constituent Assembly. . ,46
A more searching constitutional analysis exposes multiple examples of
borrowing from the U.S. experience,47 however, numerous deviations
from the original model also become exposed.
Drafted with the clearest intention to copy the U.S. template,48 the
1853 Constitution of Argentina declared that the President is "the
supreme chief of the Nation, chief of the government, and the politician
responsible for the general administration of the country."49 The original
Constitution provided, however, that the Ministers have to endorse acts
of the President, which have no effect without their co-signatures. 50 The
1994 Constitution departed even further from the U.S. model adding the
position of the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers,51 who, with other Secre-
tary-Ministers, can be censored and removed by the Parliament. 5' The
Executive, differently than in the United States, has the legislative initia-
tive 53 and Ministers may participate in Congressional debates, though
without voting rights.54
The Constitutions of Bolivia also made concessions toward the parlia-
mentary system. The Constitution of 1945, following the pattern of other
basic laws of the region, provided for the possibility of censuring the Min-
isters and introduced a countersignature requirement as a prerequisite of
enforcement of Presidential acts.55 The 1967 Constitution, amended in
46 CONSTITUI( AO FEDERAL [CONST. BRAZIL], translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES, supra note 36, at 3.
47 See Barker, supra note 18, at 891.
48 See Jonathan M. Miller, Introductory Notes: Constitutional History and Political
Background, in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD Vii (Gisbert H.
Flanz ed., 2002).
41 CONST. ARG. (1853) art. 86, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at
27; CONST. ARG. (1994) art. 99, §1, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES,
supra note 36, at 19.
50 CONST. ARG. (1853) art. 87 repealed by CONST. ARG. (1949) art. 84, translated in
AMOS J. PEASLEE, 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 64 (2d ed. 1956); See also CONST.
ARG. (1994) art. 100, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note
36, at 21 (listing the same requirement in the current Argentinean Constitution).
51 CONST. ARO. (1994) art 100, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES,
supra note 36, at 21-22.
52 Id. art 101, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 36, at
22-23.
51 Id. art 77, translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 36, at
16.
" CONST. ARG. (1853) art. 91-92, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 42,
at 23 (stating that the Ministers cannot sit in the Congress).
55 CONSTITUTION POLTICA DE BOLIVIA DE 1945 [CONST. BOL.] art. 63, translated
in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at 188; CONST. BOL. (1945) art. 100, translated in PEASLEE,
supra note 50, at 193.
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1994,6 vests in Congress the right to express no-confidence in the Minis-
ters formally appointed and dismissed by the President. 7 The Constitu-
tion, lacking consequence, states that the Minister deprived of
Congressional support has to submit his resignation; but the President
may reject it.5 The reform of 1994 extended the President's term from
four to five years. 9 It retained, however, the rule vesting in the Congress
the right to elect the President if none of the candidates received absolute
majority in the direct elections. °
United States inspirations were also clear with regard to the first Con-
stitutions of Brazil; notwithstanding the tendency, the drafters did not
duplicate the U.S. act.61 For example, the first Brazilian Republican Con-
stitution of 1889 introduced the direct election of senators62 much earlier
than the U.S. Constitution's Seventeenth Amendment.6" Brazil later
adopted Constitutions reserving for the President extensive legislative
prerogatives granting him exclusive power to initiate some laws and
adopt provisional measures with the force of law.64 The President has a
line-item veto power permitting him to demand the removal of separate
words or even special expressions or marks.6 5 The later constitutions also
56 CONST. BOL. (1945) amended by Law on the Constitutional Reform, No. 1585
(Aug. 5, 1994) (Bol.) reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES (Gisbert H.
Flanz ed., 1995) (Release 99-3, issued May 1999).
57 See id. 1967 CONST. BOL. as amended in 1994, Art. 70 sec. III. Bolivia's
Constitution of 1945 provided for a vote of censure, requiring the vote of an absolute
majority of the members present, but did not specify the result of censuring the
executive. Art. 63, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at 188.,
58 1967 Constitution as Amended in 1994.
59 Id. art. 87.
60 Id. art. 90. See also CONST. BOL. of 1945 art. 88, translated in PEASLEE, supra
note 50, at 191.
61 The main author of the Constitution was Ruy Barbosa. See THE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 58.
62 The later Constitutions provided also for the election of three Senators from
each state. See CONST. BRAZIL (1946) art. 60, § 1, translated in PEASLEE, supra note
50, at 218.
63 The Seventeenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on May 13, 1912 and
ratified on May 31, 1913. EDWARD F. COOKE, A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 131 (5th ed. 1984).
64 CONST. Brazil (1946) art. 67, § 2, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at 219.
See also CONST. BRAZIL (1988) art. 61, § 1, translated in NORTH-SOUTH CENTER, A
PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAW 425-26 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith S. Rosenn eds.,
1992) [hereinafter BRAZILIAN LAW]; CONST. BRAZIL (1988) art. 62, translated in
BRAZILIAN LAW, supra at 426.
65 CONST. Brazil (1946) art 70, § 1, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at 220.
See also David Fleischer, Brazil, in WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PARLIAMENTS AND
LEGISLATURES 95 (George Thomas Kurian ed., 1998).
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66arsnthiintroduced the countersignature requirement. In comparison to his
U.S. counterpart, the Brazilian President's veto is weaker; it is considered
in a joint session of the Chambers of Congress and may be rejected by
secret ballot of an absolute majority of the Deputies and Senators.67
Although the Brazilian Congress has the right to create and abolish Min-
istries and agencies of public administration, the right to appoint and dis-
miss Ministers is vested in the President.68 Deputies and Senators
appointed to ministerial positions do not lose their mandates but receive
leaves of absence and are temporarily replaced by alternates.69
A similar tendency may be observed in Chile, which already experi-
mented with the parliamentary system from 1891-1924. 7' The 1925 Con-
stitution retained the co-signature requirement with regard to the
President's acts, 7 ' but allowed Congress only to scrutinize the acts of the
government. The "suggestions" of Congress required a written response
from the President but did not trigger the dismissal of the Ministers.72
The Constitution of 1980, as amended on July 30 1989, vested in the Presi-
dent the right of appointment of Ministers, imposed on the members of
the Government the obligation to co-sign the President's acts, and
repeated, half-heartedly, drafted statements about "questioning" rather
than "censuring" the Ministers.74 The Constitution confirms that the
"observations" of the Congress do not undermine political responsibility
of the Ministers and that the duties of the Government will be fulfilled
simply by a Presidential response to the Chamber.75 To enhance the
powers of the President, the Constitution grants him exclusive (but lim-
66 See CONST. Brazil (1946) art. 91, § 1, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at
224.
67 CONST. BRAZIL (1988) art. 66, § 4, translated in BRAZILIAN LAW, supra note 64,
at 427. See also CONST. BRAZIL (1946) art. 70, § 3, translated in PEASLEE, supra note
50, at 220 (providing for a two-thirds majority to reject the veto).
68 CONST. BRAZIL (1946) art. 65, § IV, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at 218-
19; CONST. BRAZIL (1946) art. 87, § 3, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at 223;
CONST. BRAZIL (1988) art. 48, translated in BRAZILIAN LAW, supra note 64, at 416-17;
CONST. BRAZIL (1988) art. 84, § 1, translated in BRAZILIAN LAW, supra note 64, at
432.
69 CONST. BRAZIL (1988) art. 56, II §1, translated in BRAZILIAN LAW, supra note
64, at 422.
70 See Nino, supra note 2, at 130.
71 CONSTITUCION POLfTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE (1925) [CONST. CHILE]
art. 75, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at 497.
72 CONST. CHILE (1925) art. 39, § 2, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 50, at 489-90.
'3 CONST. CHILE (1980) art. 35, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 48 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991).
11 Id. art. 48, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 73, at
51.
75 Id. art 48, § 1, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 73,
at 51.
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ited to certain types of actions) right of legislative initiative and the right
to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies once during his eight year term of
office.76
The 1933 Constitution of Peru also provided for the institution of a
Prime Minister (President of the Council of Ministers) who chaired the
Council of Ministers and presented the names of candidates for ministe-
rial positions to the President of the Republic. 77 Modifying the U.S. sys-
tem, the drafters of the Peruvian Constitution left the President the right
to appoint and remove the Prime Minister. Although the appointments of
the Ministers had to be countersigned by the Prime Minister, they did not
require the advice and consent of the legislature.78 Still, Congress could
censure the ministers and express no-confidence in the Council of Minis-
ters.79 In the cases of a vacancy of the Presidency of the Republic, the
1933 Constitution provided for the election of a President by the Con-
gress.8" This system was changed by the Amendment of 1936, which
introduced into the Peruvian system the institution of two Vice-Presi-
dents, First and Second, who would successively conclude the incom-
pleted period of the President's office.8" In further deviation from the
U.S. prototype, the President could take command of the armed forces
only with the permission of Congress.8" Although the 1993 Constitution
introduced significant changes, making Congress a unicameral body and
again strengthening the presidential power,8" it did not bring the Peruvian
model much closer to the U.S. model.
The 1934 Constitution of Uruguay, breaking the fundamental precepts
of the presidential system, granted the President the right to dissolve the
legislature and Parliament the right to vote down the Ministers.84 The
1966 Constitution, as amended through the Plebiscite of December 8,
1996, inserted in the basic law of the country more elements of the parlia-
mentary model. The Constitution demands the Ministers' counter-signa-
76 Id. art 62, translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 73, at
55.
77 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE PERU (1933) [CONST. PERU] art. 157, translated in
AMos J. PEASLEE, 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE NATIONS 150 (2d ed. 1956).
78 Id. art. 157, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 77, at 150; id. art. 158, translated in
THE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 150. See also Nino, supra note 2, at 129.
79 CONST. PERU (1933) arts. 172-73, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 77, at 151.
The current Constitution of Peru, adopted in 1993, is the country's eighteenth
Constitution and it upheld these provisions. Id. art. 132.
80 CONST. PERU (1933) art. 147, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 77, at 148.
81 Amendment of April 1, 1936 is published in PEASLEE, supra note 77, at 159.
82 CONST. PERU (1933) art. 153, translated in PEASLEE, supra note 77, at 149.
83 CONST. PERU (1993) art. 90, translated in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 133 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1995)
84 CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLICA DE URUGUAY (1934) [CONST. URU.] arts. 136-
44, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 733-34.
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tures for the President's acts,85 but also vests in the Council of Ministers
the right to reject, by absolute majority, the act of a Minister supported
by the President. 6 The President's veto may be overruled by a three-
fifths vote of the Deputies and Senators present at the time of voting.87
The Constitution makes the government responsible before the President
and before the Parliament, which may express no-confidence either in the
entire government or a single Minister. The procedure is quite compli-
cated. The Minister who was voted down by an absolute majority of a
joint meeting of the Chambers (Asambra General) must resign. The
President can veto the decision dismissing the Minister if it was supported
by less than two-thirds of the Chambers. 88 If, however, the Parliament
insists on the dismissal of the Minister by the vote of at least three-fifths
of all deputies, then to retain the Minister the President must dissolve the
legislature. The President is limited by the constitutional rule that the
Parliament cannot be dissolved during the last year of its term or more
than once if the Parliament dismissed more than one Minister.
8 9
The drafters of the Uruguayan constitutional amendments of 1996
anticipated clashes between the President and the Parliament and incor-
porated into the Constitution several awkward and vague provisions. On
the one hand, the President, acting without the cooperation of the Parlia-
ment, may issue a resolution blocking the operation of the government.9"
On the other hand, he may ask the Parliament to confirm its confidence
in the government. If Parliament decides not to take any action, it is
assumed that the legislature still supports the government. The President
does have discretion to interpret the inactivity of the Parliament
differently.9
1
This quick review of Latin American Constitutions triggers several
observations. It confirms the intention of early Latin American leaders
to draw from the U.S. constitutional model; the borrowings are well doc-
umented and unquestionable. The review also provides evidence that, in
many instances, even in early stages of their political development the
85 CONST. URU. (1996) art. 168, § 25, translated in 20 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 34 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1998).
86 Id. art. 165, translated in 20 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 85,
at 30. See also CONST. URU. (1934) art. 176, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 42, at 741.
87 CONST. URU. (1996) art. 138, translated in 20 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES, supra note 85, at 25.
88 Id. art. 148, translated in 20 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
supra note 85, at 26-28.
89 Id.
90 Id. art 174, translated in 20 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 85, at
35.
91 CONST. URU. (1996) art. 174, translated in 20 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES, supra note 85, at 35; CONST. URU. (1996) art. 175, translated in 20
CONSITUIONS OF THE COUNTRIES, supra note 85, at 35-36.
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Latin American countries adopted the U.S. prototype with numerous
modifications. The sometimes heavy-handed attempts to experiment
with U.S. institutions were often unsuccessful and appeared to be in dis-
array. The deviations provoked serious questions. Were the adjustments
of the presidential system in Latin America caused by objective geo-polit-
ical circumstances or by a doctrinal nostalgia of the constitutional drafters
for the Latin American European legacy?92 Did the modifications of the
presidential model promote anti-democratic effects or were such effects
inherent in the U.S. prototype? These questions warrant further exami-
nation of the process of adoption in Latin America of some institutions,
which in the United States contributed to the stability of the presidential
system. Nothing was more important than the right of the U.S. courts to
review the constitutionality of laws.
IV. LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS WITH JUDICIAL REVIEW
There are no doubts that, with regard to judicial review, the countries
of this region seriously tried to duplicate the U.S. experience. As Allan
Brewer-Carias wrote:
The constitutional system of the United States influenced many of
the Latin American systems to adopt, during the nineteenth century,
the diffuse system of judicial review. Alexis de Tocqueville's influen-
tial Democracy in America,9" has been considered as having played a
fundamental role in this adoption, particularly concerning the Latin
American countries with a federal form of state. This was the case in
Mexico in 1857, Venezuela in 1858, Argentina in 1860 and Brazil in
1890. The system was also adopted in other countries like Columbia
in 1850 which had a brief federal experience, and even without con-
nection with the federal form of state, in the Dominican Republic in
1844 where it is still in force. 4
The adoption of the U.S. decentralized system of judicial review in the
civil law countries provided formidable challenges for the Latin Ameri-
can constitutional drafters. The fabric of law in civil law countries is stat-
92 As Jorge L. Esquirol wrote:
The force of this fiction [identifying Latin American law as essentially European]
rests on the shadow of illiberality cast upon actual Latin American societies.
Indeed, the notion of Europeanness is championed and defended precisely
because of its perceived unreality in society. Latin American societies are not
European, only their jurists pretend to be. The notion of Europeanness is rather
a political aspiration. Its goal is assimilating illiberal Latin America to the culture
of European democracy.
Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin America Law (Part I), 1997 UTAH L. REV.
425, 470 (1997).
11 Tocqueville's book was translated into Spanish in 1836. ALLAN R. BREWER-
CAR[AS JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 156 n.1 (1989).
94 Id. at 156.
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utory and judges are expected to apply law but are not allowed to
formulate "rules" or regulatory decisions on the validity of the laws.
Adoption of the U.S. decentralized system of judicial review, which
would allow all judges to decide about the constitutionality of applied
laws, carries a serious risk. The decentralized system requires judiciary
qualifications usually lacked by most civil law judges who are appointed
to judicial positions at the very early stages of their legal careers. In addi-
tion, the U.S. system assumes that the higher courts' decisions of the con-
stitutionality and validity of laws have been generalized through the
principle of stare decisis. Without incorporation into the civil law model
some elements of a precedential system, laws might be disqualified as
unconstitutional by some courts, and yet still held valid by others. It
could result in chaos, inconsistency and lack of certainty as to what the
law really is.
Europeans, who seriously began to experiment with judicial control in
the first decades of the twentieth century, usually followed the Austrian
"centralized" type of control, confining the power to review to a single
judicial organ, the Supreme Court or Tribunal specializing in constitu-
tional challenges.9 5 In Austria this model was first tested in 1867 and
adopted in the Constitution of October 1, 1920.96 The 1920 Constitution
vested the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a single Consti-
tutional Tribunal, and to review the legality of administrative actions in
the Supreme Administrative Court. Following the Austrian experience,
judicial control of constitutionality was adopted by the Czechoslovakian
Constitution of 1920."7 Czechoslovakia also established the Administra-
tive Tribunal in Bratislava.98 In 1921 the Supreme Administrative Tribu-
nal was formed in Poland and, until the war, the Austrian model was
adopted by most of the countries that had formally been under the influ-
ence of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.9 9
The "centralized" Austrian model was not especially helpful for post-
colonial constitutional drafters in Latin America. It was seriously
checked in practice much later then the U.S. model began making inroads
in Latin America. The Latin American judges seem more eager to build
95 Id. at 196-97; see also M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 50-51 (1971).
96 The Constitution was amended in 1929. See Z. Czeszejko-Sochacki, Trybunal
Konstytucyjny w PRL [The Constitutional Tribunal in the Polish People's Republic]
(1986), Ksiazka i Wiedza, at 15-17.
97 BREWER-CAR[AS, supra note 93, at 32.
98 See L. GARLICKI, SADOWNICTWO KONSTYTUCYJNE W EUROPIE ZACHODNIEJ
(CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN WESTERN EUROPE) 42 n.76 (1987)
99 Marek Wierzbowski, Watching Law Obedience in Poland: Supreme
Administrative Court, Constitutional Tribunal, and Representative of Citizens Rights, in
8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 8.110.3, 8.110.5-6 (Kenneth Robert Redden
et al. eds., rev. 2001)
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on the early Greek experiments with the decentralized system.' 0 In 1847
the Supreme Court of Greece reserved for itself the right to determine
the constitutionality of all legislative acts. Although the Court did not
claim the power to invalidate the acts, in the decisions in 1871 and 1879, it
confirmed that "the court has the power not to apply [the questionable
act] in the case that the court is hearing."' 0 ' The right to declare the law
"voidable" but not "void" became an important feature of the Latin
American system, clearly splitting it from the U.S. prototype.
The second special component of the Latin American system of judicial
review was incorporated from the Spanish concept known as a doctrina
legal, or legal doctrine. This was a juristic doctrine that imposed on the
lower courts a duty to follow the custom or general principles of law if the
statutes left gaps. The general principles of law could be found in opinio
juris or in la jurisprudence, the high court's opinions. °2 This major devia-
tion from the traditional concept and non-precedential character of the
civil law system followed the Spanish Supreme Court's decision of
November 4, 1838, which permitted cassation on the basis that the lower
court did not follow the "legal doctrine" established by the higher courts.
Subsequently, the right to formulate the "legal doctrine" through "the
established case law" was reserved exclusively to the Supreme Court.0 3
The Iberian concept of legal doctrine made inroads in the Latin Ameri-
can legal systems. Although the stare decisis principle has not been for-
mally recognized, the lower courts were expected to follow the position
of the Supreme Court; otherwise, the violation paved the way for an
appeal. The practice has been well confirmed by the laws of several
countries adopted at the end of nineteenth century. For example, Article
4 of the Columbian Law 169 of 1896 provided that "[t]hree uniform deci-
sions given by the Supreme Court in cassation on the same point of law
constitute probable doctrine, and the judges should apply them in ana-
logues cases, however the Supreme Court may change doctrine if it judges
the previous decisions to have been erroneous." 10 4 In the twentieth cen-
tury, the similar power of the Supreme Court was recognized in Mexico.
Richard D. Baker wrote:
Jurisprudencia (jurisprudence), in Mexico as elsewhere, is susceptible
to a wide variety of definitions. We have seen, however, that in
100 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 93, at 168.
101 Id. (quoting Greek Supreme Court Judgments No.18 (1871) and No 23 (1897)).
See also Epaminondas Spiliotopoulos, Judicial Review of Legislative Acts in Greece, 56
TEMP. L.Q. 463, 469-70 (1983).
102 L. Neville Brown, The Sources of Spanish Civil Law, 5 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 364,
364-70 (1956).
103 For more extensive examination of the 1938 decision and the Supreme Court's
subsequent decision of December 10, 1894, see Brown, id.
104 Quoted in S.W. WURFEL, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN COLUMBIA; LAWS &
POLICIES 286-87 (1965).
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amparo the term carries the special, technical meaning of obligatory
precedent. Although the Supreme Court has been assigned the
power to establish such precedents in all of the amparo legislation
since 1909, explicit constitutional recognition of this function was
lacking until the amendments of 1950-1951 were adopted. As then
written, article 107, section XIII, paragraph 1, of the Constitution
provided that "the law shall specify the terms and cases in which the
jurisprudencia of the courts of the federal judicial power is binding,
as well as the requirements for modifying it.10 5
Five consecutive decisions to the same effect, signed by the required
number of judges, established jurispudentia as a source of law.' °6
The Latin American concept of judicial review has been founded on
these two crucial elements: courts cannot apply unconstitutional law but
can declare it "voidable," not "void," and with this respect, the lower
courts may be bound by the case law established by the high courts. This
concept has not been sufficiently clear and, in fact, has never worked
smoothly with the high courts reversing their positions and the constitu-
tional assemblies leaving the explanations of the basic elements of this
system to the statutory laws. It is well illustrated even by the citations
provided above from the Columbian and Mexican laws. As quoted, the
Columbian Law 169 of 1896 has never explained what it means that the
judicial opinions on the same point constitute a "probable doctrine."'0 7
Similar indecisiveness can be found in the policy of the Mexican legisla-
ture. Article 107 of the Constitution, explaining the protection of the
rights through the proceeding of amparo, is excessively detailed and long;
yet it does not decisively regulate the application of the precedent. It
refers to the precedent but leaves for the law specification of "the terms
and cases in which the precedent of the courts of the federal judicial
branch are binding, as well as the requirements for their modification.' 0 8
S.W. Wurfel observed:
The Judicial Gazette (Gaceta Judicial), published since 1887, prints
the full text of the decisions of all chambers of the Supreme Court
and other material as ordered by the court. This is published some-
what irregularly in periodic form and is not itself converted into
bound volume form. There is nothing in Columbia comparable to the
various official reporter series of the respective states of the United
105 RICHARD D. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE Amparo
Suit 251 (1971). The amparo proceeding in Mexico provides for the protection of the
courts of any person's constitutional rights violated by public authorities. For further
discussion on amparo see Barker, supra note 18, at 905-07; BREWER-CARfAS, supra
note 93, at 163-67.
106 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 93, at 167.
107 WURFEL, supra note 104.
108 CONSTITUCION POLUTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [CoNsT. MEX.]
art. 107, § XIII. See also BAKER, supra note 105, at 251.
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States nor the West Publishing Company series of unofficial reports.
There is no topical digest system and no case headnotes, except
annotations to codes and texts by individual authors. . . . Official
reporters of the Supreme Court or individual judges or lawyers, as a
private enterprise, on occasion prepare digests of Supreme Court
decisions for a period of years. These are not complete nor always
consecutive. These works are know as jusriprudencia. They consti-
tute the only readily available source of court decisions and are usu-
ally not current. °9
To sum up, the Latin American doctrine, lacking common law tradi-
tions, could not adopt the U.S. decentralized system of judicial review in
its pure form, namely the one rooted in the concept of stare decisis. On
the other hand, rather than attempting to adopt the prevailing European
model of abstract and centralized review, the Latin Americans decided to
experiment with a mixed model incorporating elements of decentralized
and centralized review blended with the concept of acts being not-appli-
cable, or voidable, but not entirely nullified. The high courts' juris-
prudencia was not well registered or reported, and enforcement of the
legal doctrine lacked consistency."' The Latin American judicial system
resulted in uncertainty, which further contributed to the lack of stability
of the Latin American legal systems.
V. THE HYBRID MODEL: OBJECTIVE REASONS TO SEARCH
FOR ALTERNATIVES
The comments presented above illustrate that a combination of civil
and common law traditions worked against the full assimilation of the
U.S system in Latin American realities. Several additional factors
strengthen the trend toward searching for alternative solutions.
First, it has to be noted that, in Latin America, U.S. presidentialism was
tested in very special ethnic circumstances and cultural traditions much
different than those of North America. Although the colonists in both
Americas had to deal with the pre-Columbian population as well as
imported African slaves, they resolved their ethnic problems differently.
The North American colonists came from many parts of Europe but
predominantly from Great Britain."' They brought with them English
constitutional traditions, well rooted in developing concepts of parlia-
mentary government. 112 They retained these traditions during the strug-
gle for independence. Despite social fragmentation and a variety of
109 WURFEL, supra note 104, at 286-88.
110 For the "limits of judicial review in fostering the rule of law" in Latin America,
see Farer, supra note 20, at 1310-25.
111 CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8-9
(1943)
112 Id. at 9.
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religious factions, the North American settlers remained much more
homogenous than their South American counterparts.
The Iberian colonists brought relatively few women with them which
resulted in a much stronger race mixture than in Northern America.113
Although the Spanish and Portuguese colonists retained their cultural
dominance, Latin America produced communities that were a very spe-
cific blend of culture, races, religions, customs, languages, and legal
traditions.
Tradition is one of the most stable components of political culture; cul-
tural memories are not deleted or replaced overnight. The adoption of
legal and political models requires high levels of public emotion, disputes,
and moral sensitivities.' 14 The process of assimilating democratic models
is particularly demanding and contingent on the elites' ability to animate
politically passive groups of society. The efforts to achieve these results
in Latin America were not successful enough. Although the evaluation
of cultural phenomena is always controversial, one has to admit that,
given at least the level of communication of social groups and degree of
information spread among indigenous communities, the political and
legal culture of Latin American societies was relatively less mature than
in North America. The Latin American constitutional culture was domi-
nated by elites who did not make a serious effort to increase political
participation of indigenous groups, women," 5 racial or religious minori-
ties, 1 6 or peasants. 1 7 The attempts to transform Latin American consti-
tutions into multicultural basic laws, protecting everyone's rights and
113 See Ralph L. Woodward, Jr., Latin America, in 15 FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA 418 (1986). For more general comments on Latin American history,
people and problems, see also RALPH WOODWARD, CENTRAL AMERICA: A NATION
DIVIDED (1976).
114 For more comments see Rett Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New
East-Central European Democracies, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 1, 11-14 (2000).
115 For more comments see generally Michael Posner, Human Rights and Non-
Governmental Organizations on the Eve of the Next Century, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
627 (1997); Gaby Or6-Aquilar, Sexual Harassment and Human Rights in Latin
America, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 631 (1997).
116 For more comments on the protection of religious rights in Latin America, see
Paul E. Sigmund, Religious Human Rights in Latin America, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV
173 (1996).
117 For more general comments on the protection of human rights in Latin
America, see generally Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The
Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective
and a Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593 (2000). See also
Roseanne M. Latore, Coming Out of the Dark: Achieving Justice for Victims of
Human Rights Violations by South American Military Regimes, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 419 (2002).
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involving these groups into common social activities, have been noted,
but their implementation still was not impressive.
118
Since the early stages of the post-colonial history, the societies of Latin
America were highly polarized and for this reason, in comparison with
Northern America, the elites were more determined to look for efficient
measures of control and less prepared to accept democratic institutions
despite hardships accompanying the process of democratization. The
Iberian leaders did not adopt the U.S. presidential system to protect the
democratic foundations of their societies' political culture. They were
rather searching for the system that would help them to unite the politi-
cally inexperienced and ethnically diversified societies.1 19 As Jacques
Lambert wrote:
There was on the one hand the need for an executive power stronger
than in Europe to prevent the disintegration of their young states,
and on the other hand the need to prevent the head of the executive
from being tempted to use his dominance as a stepping stone to dic-
tatorship. The existence of caudillismo and the submissiveness of the
backward populations to the person of their master made this temp-
tation even stronger.12
0
Although there is nothing inherently wrong in the tendency to favor
strong personal managements,1 21 it must to be noted that the U.S. con-
cept of presidential power was developed as a result of the intensive
debate focusing not on the benefits of a strong executive, but rather on
limitations or balance of a single executive officer's power. 122 While the
118 The thesis on multicultural transformation of Latin American constitutionalism
was most strongly illustrated by DONNA LEE VAN Co-IT, THE FRIENDLY
LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA (2000).
For the constructive criticism of this thesis, see Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Notice,
Premature Predictions of Multiculturalism?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1470 (2002).
119 Harry Kantor wrote:
The leaders of the victorious armies in the new Latin American republics seemed
to see the need for a strong executive around which they could unite the various
population in their new republics; yet they wanted to check the power of the new
presidents, so they took the US system of checks and balances as their model.
Harry Kantor, Efforts Made by Various Latin American Countries to Limit the Power
of the President, in PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT supra note 2, at 101.
120 Jacques Lambert, Latin America. Social Structure and Political Institutions, in
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN
EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 346 (1978).
121 Juan J. Linz who wrote, "Even if one were to accept the debatable notion that
Hispanic societies are inherently prone to personalizmo, there can be little doubt that
in some cases this tendency receives reinforcement from institutional arrangements."
The Perils of Presidentialism, in PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT supra note 2, at 100.
122 The scope of the presidential power was first addressed by Alexander Hamilton
at the Philadelphia Convention on June 18, 1787. Hamilton's political concepts were
not enthusiastically accepted by the delegates of the Convention who believed that his
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North Americans wanted to have the executive well-balanced, and there-
fore unable to turn to dictatorship, the Latin Americans wanted their
presidents to be strong, but non-dictatorial. The focus was clearly differ-
ent; for drafters of the U.S. Constitution the presidential system meant,
first of all, the developed concept of checks and balances; for Latin
Americans it meant the model of governance concentrated around the
executive power. The difference in approach significantly effected the
Latin American reception of the U.S. model.
Second, it has often been argued that, in spite of the deficiencies of the
governmental model and the abuses of presidential prerogatives, the
Latin American court system worked and was able to protect individual
constitutional rights.123 As Jacques Lambert observed:
This independence of the judiciary exists on the national level in any
case; when the regime is a federal one, the state courts may be of
much lower quality. This is also true of certain states in the United
States. The point to be kept in mind is that while in Latin America
political freedom is often endangered, as in so many other develop-
ing regions, arbitrary action is always limited in the major and most
representative countries. Latin American countries differ in this
respect from developing countries in other parts of the world
because their courts are determined to enforce the rule of law.124
In fact, the courts' protection of the people's rights in Latin America,
although admirable, 125 has not sufficiently safeguarded the operation of
the presidential model. The courts of general jurisdiction in civil law
countries are not well prepared to decide political issues dealing with the
distribution of power.'26 The Latin American courts tried to exercise
some of these functions, but tried inefficiently. They focused on the pro-
federal government would eliminate the states and that the president, being elected
for life, would accumulate almost autocratic power, which would in turn create a
monarchy. For a summary of the dispute, see Rett R. Ludwikowski, Politicization and
Judicialization of the U.S. Chief Executive's Political and Criminal Responsibility: A
Threat to Constitutional Integrity or a Natural Result of the Constitution's Flexibility,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 405, 408-10 (2002).
123 See Fernando Carrillo Fl6rez, Supreme Courts of the Americas Organization:
Judicial Independence and its Relationship with the Legislative Bodies, 42 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1033, 1042 (1998) (commenting on the effectiveness of the Latin American
courts' fight against corruption and organized crime).
124 Lambert, supra note 120, at 342.
125 For illustrating examples, see Barker, supra note 18, at 893. See also comments
of Thomas C. Wright on the general improvement of the human rights protection in
Latin America through the 1990s and in this century. Thomas C. Wright, Human
Rights in Latin America: History and Projections for the Twenty-First Century, 30 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 303 (2000).
126 Some experts, reaching controversial conclusions, have been inclined to
associate weaknesses of the judiciary with features of the parliamentary system rather
than the civil law system. See, e.g., Fl6rez, supra note 123, at 1036 (stating "the
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tection of civil liberties and were unable to protect the system of constitu-
tional checks and balances. Some constitutions reserved for the Supreme
Courts the right to decide cases and vertical conflicts between the federal,
or central, and local governmental agencies; however, they rarely gave
the courts clear authority to decide horizontal conflicts dealing with the
distribution of power between the legislative and executive organs.' 2 7
Even if the basic law vested in the courts general jurisdiction over all
constitutional issues, 128 the courts were unable to stand up against the
dictatorial Presidents and guarantee actual equilibrium of the constitu-
tional system.
29
Third, it was often argued that the process of democratization of the
Latin American presidentialism has been hampered by corporatism typi-
cal of this region. 130  Corporative groups, such as the military, the
Church, trade unions, as well as cooperating and often affiliated compa-
nies, created mechanisms dysfunctional for presidentialism. 13' The
bureaucratic elites, often corrupted and operating at the back-stage of the
system, crippled the creation of a healthy middle-class, the operation of
political parties, and mechanisms of public participation in power. The
social model, dubbed "praetorianism" by Samuel Huntington, can be
characterized by "a low degree of institutionalization with a high degree
of participation of mobile social forces that penetrate the political
spheres, resulting in confrontations between new active social forces and
between them and traditional establishment.' 32 Latin American adop-
tion of some features of continental European systems of government, 133
namely "mixed" quasi-presidential models, have often been viewed as the
best remedy for this problem. As the Council for the Consolidation of
parliamentary regime has denaturalized the judicial function and failed to recognize
the disposition and nature of the power entrusted with carrying out such functions.").
127 See, e.g., CONST. BRAZIL (1946), art. 101, §V, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 42, at 80-81.
128 See CONST. ARG. (1853) art 100, translated in THE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
42, at 30.
129 Lambert, supra note 120, at 341
It would be nave to think that independence of the judges could prevent
dictatorships and revolutions, or that dictatorships and revolutions always respect
the independence of the judiciary. Far from testifying to the servility of judges,
the fact that the only way of subjugating them was to remove them, as Per6n,
Castro, and Paz Estenssoro did and as Cardenas wanted to do, proves on the
contrary that the judges in their countries were traditionally independent.
Id.
130 See generally Nino, supra note 2.
131 Id. at 47.
132 See Guillermo O'Donnell, Corporatism and the Question of the State, in
AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA 56 (James M. Malloy
ed., 1977).
133 Nino was inclined to opt for the adoption in Latin America of some stabilizing
features that were well-tested in Germany and Spain. Nino, supra note 2, at 60-61.
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Democracy concluded with regard to Argentina, "[t]he main point of the
institutional transformation proposed by the Council is to change our
presidential system of government to a 'mixed' system."' 4 The conclu-
sion warrants some additional commentary.
VI. ANTI-DEMOCRATIC FEATURES OF PRESIDENTIALISM? SEVERAL
OBSERVATIONS ON PRESIDENTIALISM, AUTHORITARIANISM,
AND TOTALITARIANISM
Observation that U.S. presidentialism does not fit Latin American
needs has been often translated into full-fledged criticism of the presiden-
tial system in toto, and its portrayal as inherently "less democratic" than
parliamentary or mixed systems. Juan J. Linz wrote that, "[a] careful
comparison of parliamentarism as such with presidentialism as such leads
to the conclusion that, on balance, the former is more conducive to stable
democracy than the latter."' 35 Carlos S. Nino elaborated even further on
this thesis:
In practical terms, this [counterbalancing corporate power] requires
the promotion of broad popular participation in voting, discussion,
and direct decisions, and political parties organized on the basis of
principles and programs, with active and participative members and
with an internal democracy whose results are enforced in a disci-
plined way. But this kind of a strong democracy is functionally
incompatible with a presidentialist system of government, which
tends to weaken political parties; further, even if this weakening does
not occur for diverse historical and cultural factors, the difficulties
inherent in the presidential system-the erosion of the presidential
figure, blockages between powers, the difficulties of forming coali-
tions-are serious and dangerous threats to the stability of the
system. 36
134 The Report elaborated on the benefits of the transition. Constitutional Reform
in Argentina: Council for the Consolidation of Democracy, in PRESIDENTIAL
GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 158-61.
A mixed system, in turn, allows for the formation of the said alliances while
maintaining the personalities of the parties involved-and consequently
democratic pluralism-due to the temporary nature of the agreements .... In
semi-presidential systems, it is of utmost importance to delineate precisely the
functions of the President and those of the prime minister and his or her
government.
Id.
135 Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, in PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT,
supra note 2, at 119 (emphasizing that "[tlhis conclusion applies especially to nations
with deep political cleavages and numerous political parties; for such countries,
parliamentarism generally offers a better hope preserving democracy.").
136 Nino, supra note 2, at 60.
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Nino's observation brings to mind the chicken and egg game and the
syllogism presented above raises a lot of reservations. Making a conjunc-
tion between statements that presidentialism is less democratic than other
systems and presidentialism does not fit Latin America is at least debata-
ble. The debate brings with it shadows of the dispute on "circulation" of
political systems, namely inevitable transitions of presidentialism into
authoritarianism from the one side of a spectrum, and transition of totali-
tarianism to authoritarianism from the other side. Very few of these
"apparently inevitable" processes have been confirmed by practice.
The analyses of the last stages in the crisis of communism posed the
question about a transition from a totalitarian system into an authorita-
rian model of government. The possibility of evolutionary, rather than
revolutionary, change seemed to be supported by reformism and revi-
sionism of the 1950s and later by the Gorbachev's reforms of the 1980s.
The first period brought up the concept of communism with "a human
face" or "reform from within." The second period opened a Pandora's
Box of speculation on the effectiveness of perestroika and glasnost.137
The predictions of evolutionary transformation of the Soviet totalitar-
ian regime did not prove true. The crisis of communist ideology was irre-
versible. It undermined the rudiments of communist morality and
corroded not only Marxist-Leninist values, but also the functioning of the
pragmatic components of the system, namely the party bureaucracy and
nomenklatura system. Without these key ingredients the system could be
overturned but not reformed. 13
The question remains whether the recent Chinese experiments with
market mechanisms provide arguments supporting the thesis on the pos-
sible transformation of totalitarianism into an authoritarian system of
government. In the author's opinion, the evidence is still insufficient.
The flirtation of the Chinese regime with the Western mechanisms did
not replace totalitarian socialism; it only reduced the importance of one
of the key elements that characterized the socialist economy, namely
exclusive ownership of productive resources by the state. The other
ingredients, such as general income redistribution controlled by the gov-
ernment, central planning, and democratic centralism, which combines a
centralized decision-making process with initiative of local managers,
remained largely intact. Several crucial elements of totalitarian rule still
exist. The society is severely atomized despite the rhetoric emphasizing
the values of "collective mentality." The communist ideology is used to
verify the credibility of individuals, and the system of "negative selec-
tion," which promotes compliant, conformable "yes-men," still func-
137 For further comment on communism and the Soviet Constitution see generally
RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI, THE CRISIS OF COMMUNISM: ITs MEANING, ORIGINS AND
PHASES (1986); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Soviet Constitutional Changes of the Glasnost
Era: A Historical Perspective, 10 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L 119 (1989).
138 LUDWIKOWSKI, THE CRISIS OF COMMUNISM, supra note 137, at X.
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tions. 139 The further transformation of the system toward
authoritarianism cannot be ruled out but is by no means inevitable.
The post-socialist political transformation by countries of the region of
former Soviet dominance has been more instructive. Crushing totalitari-
anism did not guarantee a smooth or automatic transition to democracy,
rather a significant political vacuum was created by geopolitical circum-
stances and resulted in uncertainty, confusing the process of adopting an
appropriate system of governance. The early expectations of the easy vic-
tory of parliamentarism over the presidential system in this region proved
to be only partially true. These expectations were based on the assump-
tion that the people of the post communist countries, disenchanted with
the uni-personal communist leadership, would view strong presidents as
potential dictatorial figures, and the presidential systems consequently
less representative and democratic. It was also expected that the familiar-
ity of constitutional drafters with the traditional socialist concept of sov-
ereignty of parliament would contribute to the natural preference for
parliamentary systems. In fact, while parliamentarianism generally pre-
vailed in the satellite states of the former Soviet bloc and in the Baltic
States, it celebrated no successes in the other Soviet republics. 4 ' The
new states of Caucasus and Central Asia followed the suit of Slavic
republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and clearly opted for an author-
itarian system hidden behind presidentialist rhetoric. Still, the totalitar-
ian system did not simply evolve into authoritarianism. It was crushed
and replaced formally by presidentialism, which deviated into
authoritarianism.
Early experiments with presidentialism by the new post-socialist coun-
tries seem to duplicate some of the Latin American experiences. As Jac-
ques Lambert wrote,
In the most frequent, almost normal type of authoritarian regime in
Latin America, the presidential regime operates in such a way that
congress, although legally in possession of the powers provided by
the constitution, is in fact subject to the president's will. Thus, the
institutions provided by the constitution remained undiminished as
instruments of government, but those who govern make unforeseen
use of those instruments.' 41
This observation fits perfectly with the post-communist experience; how-
ever, it emphasizes only how little these regions have really taken from
the U.S. model.
139 For a more general discussion of the main ingredients of totalitarianism, see id.
at 32-33.
140 See WIKTOR OSIATYNSKI, TWOJA KONSTYTUCJA (YOUR CONSTITUTION) 82
(1997). See also Holmes, supra note 35, at 39; Ludwikowski, supra note 15, at 31-41.
141 Lambert, supra note 120, at 333.
HYBRID CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA
As this article attempts to prove, the presidential system of the United
States has its theoretical roots in the theory of the separation of pow-
ers.142 Its framework, however, was enhanced by the charismatic person-
alities of early presidents such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,
and James Madison. Democratic components of the system were not
only rooted in the Constitution of the United States but also solidified by
the political culture of North American societies.
The experience of several post-socialist Soviet republics and Latin
American states only prove that the presidential system may not fit coun-
tries without a functioning system of checks and balances; protected by a
social consensus and maturity of political leaders; and mature political
culture of the people, namely cultural foundations, traditions, instruments
of social dialogue, developed systems of communication, and well-bal-
anced emotions. Observation confirms the well-known understanding
that democratization could not be accomplished overnight regardless of
whether it is attempted within a parliamentary or presidential framework.
This conclusion does not prove that the parliamentary or mixed systems
would be a panacea for all the problems of the Latin American or post-
communist societies; or that the presidential system is inherently "less
democratic" than parliamentary systems of governance and for these rea-
sons more exposed to traps of authoritarianism.
Analysis of the former Soviet republics' experiments shows that these
countries replaced communist decorative, pseudo-democratic language
by rhetoric of presidentialism. Most of the leaders of the new Central
Asian or Caucasian republics claim that they picked a presidential model
as more democratic than a parliamentary system. In fact, many of the
new governments are already "mixed" in a way that does not have much
in common with the U.S. model. Incorporation of features of a parlia-
mentary system, such as the right of a head of the state to dissolve the
legislature (in Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, Uzbekistan), and the incorporation of an institution of Prime Minis-
ter controlled by the President, actually only contributes to strengthening
the presidential power. The point is that, with the constitutions still hav-
ing a window-dressing character, the constitutional "mixing" resulted in
more, not less, power reserved for the Presidents and did not guarantee
either stability or democratization of the system.
To sum up, neither the thesis about the stabilizing character of the
"mixed" systems or about anti-democratic features of presidentialism in
toto are sufficiently supported by solid arguments. This author is not
inclined to univocally glorify the U.S. system; it has its own problems,
which would require a separate commentary.1 43 Saying this does not
mean that the U.S. system is inherently "less democratic" than other sys-
tems. Without preparing a litmus-test of the level of sufficient "democra-
142 Verney, supra note 21, at 184.
143 For more comments, see generally Ludwikowski, supra note 6.
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tization" based on the comparative analysis of many factors, (such as
active involvement of its citizenry in constitutional dialogue, development
of mechanisms supporting civic society, development of institutions of
direct public participation in power, everyday public political activity,
influence of media on political life, and many others) the thesis about the
non-democratic character of the presidential system is not well-founded.
Moreover, it is more confusing than useful for the evaluation of projected
reforms in Latin America.
VII. CONCLUSIONS: WILL MORE "MIXING" WORK FOR
LATIN AMERICA?
The main goal of this Article was to report on the complexity of the
process of adopting well-tested constitutional models of governance.
The problems with a faithful assimilation of classic models usually result
in searching for "mixed" systems that blend together features developed
by a variety of geopolitical circumstances. Unfortunately, the hybrid
models rarely work according to expectations of the governmental engi-
neers. The following summaries wrap up the observations made above.
First, Latin American intentions to experiment with the U.S. presiden-
tial model are unquestionable. It is, however, equally clear that the coun-
tries of this region attempted to build this model into a civil law
framework while wrestling with geo-political circumstances, which have
been much different than those in the United States. The attempt
resulted in early blending of the features of civil and common law sys-
tems, the attempt to reconcile the concepts of centralized and decentral-
ized judicial review, and efforts to mix the presidential and parliamentary
models of governance.
Second, the authoritarian experiences of Latin American countries,
and many other problems faced by the region's political communities,
seemed to justify the reflection emphasizing inherent problems of the
presidential system itself rather than the deficiencies in the adoption pro-
cess. Whether the objective problems of the region or the inherent
problems of the system to be adopted came first has never been clear. In
fact, the explanation of this issue is not trivial at all. The diagnosis of the
"disease" is not really a pure result of a chicken and egg game; it might
weigh heavily on the Latin American future. It has to be clearly stated
that the experiments with presidentialism proved only that the politics do
not tolerate any vacuum. Presidentialism did not work well in this region,
not because the system is not fundamentally democratic, but because the
Latin American societies were not prepared for its assimilation. For
example, widely discussed corporatism began replacing the democratic
social mechanisms and hampering the process of democratic transforma-
tion in Latin America, not because this process was inevitable in the pres-
idential framework, but because elements balancing the system, such as
parties, court structures, judicial review, features of political and legal cul-
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ture of these societies, and many others, did not work properly.
Although the truth is usually somewhere between two extremes, the
question of which of these phenomena came first is not meaningless.
Favoring either "egg" or "chicken" suggests different remedies for Latin
American problems.
Third, Latin American experiences with over-powerful presidencies are
well known, and numerous remedies adopted to improve the system were
tested repeatedly. Opinio juris suggested that reforms, such as no re-elec-
tion schemes for presidents, experiments with collective executives, crea-
tion of independent agencies, elimination of corporatism or
praetorians, 4 and many others, should be carefully checked in practice.
The studies usually concluded that Latin America has already overplayed
its "presidentialism card" and needs to borrow again from other systems
that were well checked in practice. This time, the target is the mixed,
European quasi-presidential or quasi-parliamentary system. These sug-
gestions have to be carefully examined.
The operation of the "mixed systems" is not usually contingent on the
introduction of new checks; the excessive number of limitations and
restraints may contribute to governmental impotence. The mixed sys-
tems stay operational not when more checks are added but when the
right number of checks results in the balance between powers. This
observation is well illustrated by the political histories of France and Ger-
many, the models from which the leaders of Latin America countries
most often try to borrow.
On the one hand, it must be remembered that the French Third and
Fourth Republics had a parliamentary system in which the predominant
position of the Parliament resulted in instability. 45 On the other hand,
the charismatic personality of Charles de Gaulle, in the Fifth Republic,
seemed to contribute to an excessive centralization of administration
around the President's office.1 46 The situation changed in the eighties
and nineties of the twentieth century, when the effectiveness of the presi-
dential leadership in France seemed to be undermined by the lack of the
majority's support in the Parliament for de Gaulle's successors. In fact,
however, the French experiences with cohabitation between politically
different Presidents and Prime Ministers did not weaken the President's
prerogatives. Rather, the differences strengthened two important ele-
ments of a parliamentary government, the National Assembly and Prime
Minister. In effect, surprisingly, the stronger legislature and a stronger
Prime Minister contributed to the stability of this system. The stability
results not from a further "mixing" but from bringing the French model
closer to a well-tested parliamentary-cabinet system purged of "spas-
144 For additional comments see Nino, supra note 2.
145 See DRAGNICH, supra note 37, at 211.
146 Id. 211-12
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modic"' 4 7 features of quasi-presidentialism or excesses of "pure" parlia-
mentarism of the Third and Fourth Republic.
In a similar way, the personality of Konrad Adenauer, the first post-
war chancellor, contributed to the development of a specific German
"chancellor democracy., 14' The fact that the system did not evolve into
excessive forms of personal leadership is due to a number of factors
viewed as constitutional stabilizing institutions, such as: constructive vote
of no-confidence, legislative emergency procedures, two-party system,
existence of independent and very active courts of general jurisdiction, as
well as the aggressive Constitutional Tribunal that is separated from the
regular courts. The point is that, in both France and Germany, the consti-
tutional balance was reached not solely through restraining one partner
of a political drama but rather through enhancing temporarily weakened
partners or creating new centers of power or authority lacked in the
country. The success of the reforms was also contingent on the maturity
of the political and legal culture of these societies.
The experiences of France and Germany, and many other countries
that tested constitutional "mixing," suggest that most often these states
ended up with slightly modified versions of parliamentarism. The real
power of executive leaders was contingent on their personalities and geo-
political circumstances, rather than on institutionally guaranteed preroga-
tives. For this reason, Latin America may not need more but less "mix-
ing." The countries of this region have to realize that many institutions
that have been already tested, such as the possibility of the dissolution of
the parliaments by the Presidents, the establishment of double executives
with Prime Ministers responsible both before the heads of state and legis-
lative bodies, the no-reelection schemes, joint parliamentary and cabinet
appointments, are not features of a "mixed system." These factors simply
transformed the presidential model into a parliamentary one.149 The
problem is that, as is well illustrated by the experience of many post-
communist states, the parliamentary model does not automatically guar-
antee democratization of the system of governance. Neither presidential
nor parliamentary systems work as a Santa Clause to bring the demo-
cratic results overnight.
Fourth, the discussion whether the introduction of new institutions can
improve the actual performance of the political systems or whether the
systems have to "grow" like trees or flowers and need time to find their
147 For wider discussion of "a spasmatic character" of French quasi-
presidentialism, see Maurice Duverger, A New Political System Model: Semi-
Presidential Government, 8 EUR. J. POL. RES. 165, 171 (1980). See also SARTORI,
supra note 39, at 122 (1994).
148 DRAGNICH, supra note 37, at 267-68.
149 For more comments on suggested further concessions toward a parliamentary
system, such as the joint parliamentary and cabinet appointments, and coalition
governments, see Farer, supra note 20, at 1327.
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own "fertilizers" is as old as political philosophy itself. The extremes of
both approaches have to be evaluated and they have to mitigate the Latin
American trust in the "quick fixing" of all regional problems.
For example, Latin American countries definitely need a mature party
system and it cannot be set up from above by a quick institutional reform;
the development of parties requires active grass-root movements rather
than decisions made at the center of political leadership.
Latin America, most likely, has to abandon its experiments with a
mixed system of judicial review; it needs a centralized, European style
model rooted in civil law traditions and vesting the power of review in
one special tribunal, separated from regular courts. The regional decen-
tralized model, based on a semi-stare decisis principle, has never worked
properly.
The region also needs a well-balanced system of checks and balances
founded on the steadily developed political and legal culture of the Latin
American societies. It needs not only multicultural constitutions protect-
ing everyone's rights but it also needs implementing laws, active
ombusdmen, and real social attitudes involving indigenous groups and
racial minorities in the everyday politics.15° This goal cannot be reached
exclusively through spectacular changes in the distribution of power.
Strengthening of the weakened power has to be accompanied by a simul-
taneous process of the building of Latin American civic societies. It
requires new communication systems, developed social dialogue, and a
mature and well-educated judiciary. Most importantly, it requires public
determination to protect the rule of law.
150 See VAN Corr, supra note 118, at 78-87, 175-78. As Kirsten Carlson claimed,
"Van Cott asserts that the constitutions written in Latin America in the 1990s are
multicultural but she never established any criteria for determining whether a
constitution is truly multicultural. Her only evidence of multiculturalism resides in the
existence of constitutional provisions giving rights to indigenous groups." Carlson,
supra note 118, at 1477.

